Abstract. We present improved cryptanalysis of two second-round SHA-3 candidates: the AESbased hash functions ECHO and Grøstl. We explain methods for building better differential trails for ECHO by increasing the granularity of the truncated differential paths previously considered. In the case of Grøstl, we describe a new technique, the internal differential attack, which shows that when using parallel computations designers should also consider the differential security between the parallel branches. Then, we exploit the recently introduced Super-Sbox attacks, that proved to be very efficient when attacking AES-like permutations, to achieve a very efficient utilization of the available freedom degrees. Finally, we obtain the best known attacks so far for both ECHO and Grøstl. In particular, we are able to mount a distinguishing attack for the full Grøstl-256 compression function or internal permutations.
Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions are very important tools in cryptography, used in many applications such as digital signatures, authentication schemes or message integrity. Informally, a hash function H is a function that takes an arbitrarily long message as input and outputs a fixed-length hash value of size n bits. The classical security requirements for such a function are collision resistance and (second)-preimage resistance. Namely, it should be impossible for an adversary to find a collision (two distinct messages that lead to the same hash value) in less than 2 n/2 hash computations, or a (second)-preimage (a message hashing to a given challenge) in less than 2 n hash computations. Moreover, those primitives are traditionally used to simulate the behavior of a random oracle [2] and while the community is divided on such a requirement, in the ideal case an attacker should not be able to distinguish a hash function from a random oracle.
As many standardized hash functions [31, 41] have been broken a few years ago [44, 45] , the NIST launched in 2008 the SHA-3 competition [33] that will lead to the future hash function standard. 14 candidates among 51 have been selected for the second round and many of them (like ECHO [3] , Grøstl [14] or SHAvite-3 [5] ) are actually using some parts of the standardized block cipher AES [10, 32] as internal primitives or mimicking the structure of this cipher. While AES-256 can no more be considered as secure in the related-key model [7] , the cryptography community has made important progresses concerning the evaluation of AES-based hash functions security [15, 19, 23, [25] [26] [27] 35] . Those attacks make an extensive use of the freedom degrees that are available in a hash function and even provides the best known distinguishing attack against AES-128 [15] in the known-key model [21, 30] . Much recent analysis of AES-based hash functions has helped to identify the limits of current techniques, but as we show in this paper, it is possible to improve the differential path building methods used so far.
Our contributions. In this paper, we improve the best known cryptanalysis results [1, 15, 18, 26, 27] on two second round SHA-3 candidates: the hash functions ECHO [3] and Grøstl [14] . While we do not provide advances regarding the freedom degrees optimization, we use the recently introduced Super-Sbox techniques [15, 23] in order to find pairs of inputs verifying a given differential path. We then exploit some specific properties of ECHO and Grøstl to derive very good differential paths. More precisely, we improve the previously known truncated differential paths for ECHO by reducing the size of the truncated words considered. This allows us to broaden the differential trail search space, therefore increasing our probability to find a good path, but also augmenting the search complexity. We circumvent this constraint by giving a heuristic method to prune the potential candidates. Concerning Grøstl, we describe a novel yet simple cryptanalysis technique: the internal differential attack. It may be applied for functions using parallel branches that are not sufficiently made distinct. In that case, the attacker can find input instances (where a classical differential attack exhibits pairs of inputs) verifying non random properties on the output. As a result, we improve the complexity for distinguishing the internal permutation of ECHO from a random 2048-bit permutation for a number of rounds corresponding to the full 256-bit version. Because of the folding phase after the permutation application at the end of the ECHO compression function, this attack does not translate into a distinguishing attack for the full ECHO compression function, nor the hash function itself. We provide also the first distinguishing attack on the full internal permutations for the 256-bit version of Grøstl, which can be directly derived into a distinguisher on the full Grøstl-256 compression function. Structural distinguishers (independent of the number of rounds) were already described in the original submission document [14] . For example, it was already identified that one can find fixed points or build a distinguisher for the compression function with the generalized birthday paradox [43] . However, our results also allow to distinguish the Grøstl compression function from the same construction when assuming the two internal permutations P and Q as ideal. This is not the case for the known structural distinguishers since they already consider the two internal permutations as ideal. Our results are also interesting because they exploit the specificities of P and Q which is essential in order to really evaluate the security margin of this hash function in terms of number of rounds. Finally, this also shows that the permutations P and Q used in Grøstl-256 can not be considered as ideal permutations. Because of its output function, this attack does not translate into a distinguishing attack for the full Grøstl hash function.
All the results and the corresponding computation/memory complexities for ECHO, ECHO-SP (the simple-pipe version of ECHO) and Grøstl are summarized in Table 1 . The results concerning the internal permutation of ECHO are given in Appendix. Note that none of the results described in this article seem to endanger the security of the ECHO compression function or the Grøstl hash function. 
Building differential trails with truncated differences
Cryptanalysis of AES-based hash functions began with the hash family proposal Grindahl [20] for which collision attacks have been found [19, 35] . This showed that truncated differentials [20, 22] are very useful when cryptanalyzing a byte-oriented primitive such as the AES. Namely, instead of looking at the actual difference value of a byte, one only checks if a byte contains a difference (active byte) or not (inactive byte). In particular, this allows the attacker to handle the non-linear Sboxes quite nicely when building differential trails. On the other hand, the differential transitions through the linear MixColumns layer will now be verified probabilistically.
The matrix multiplication underlying the MixColumns transformation on a r-byte column for AES or Grøstl presents the interesting property of being a Maximum-Distance Separable (MDS) mapping: the number of active input and output bytes is always greater or equal to r + 1 (unless there is no active input and output byte at all). When picking random inputs, the probability of success of a differential transition that meets the MDS constraints through a MixColumns layer is determined by the number of active bytes in the output. More precisely, if such a differential transition contains k active bytes in one column of the output, its probability of success will approximatively be equal to 2 −8×(r−k) . For example, a 4 → 1 transition for one column of the AES MixColumns layer has success probability of approximatively 2 −24 . Note that the same reasoning applies when dealing with the invert function of the MixColumns layer as well.
Rebound attacks
The rebound attack [27] is a new technique for using efficiently the available freedom degrees. The authors utilize truncated differential paths in which most of the cost lies in the middle rounds. Then, by using a local meet-in-the-middle-like technique, the freedom degrees are consumed in the middle part of the differential path, right where they can improve at best the overall complexity. More precisely, some rounds in the middle (the controlled rounds) will be verified with only a few operations on average, while the rest of the path both in forward and backward direction (the uncontrolled rounds) is fulfilled probabilistically. This cryptanalysis provides good results [23, 25] and can work without any special constraint on the differential path. However, the controlled part is limited to two rounds.
Start-from-the-middle attacks
In [26] , the start-from-the-middle attack for AES-like permutations is introduced. It can be seen as a generalization of the previous technique in the sense that the idea is simply to use the freedom degrees for AES-like permutations in the "most expensive" part of the differential trail, without setting any constraint in the way this is handled. The "cheaper" parts are then covered in an inside-out manner in both forward and backward directions. The authors describe a freedom degrees use example that can control 3 rounds in the middle part, without increasing the complexity (i.e. with only a few operations). However, the depicted technique only works for specific differential paths, in which the number of active bytes in the controlled rounds is not too important. We refer to the original publication [26] for more details. 
The Super-Sbox cryptanalysis technique
Finally, another example of start-from-the-middle attacks is the Super-Sbox cryptanalysis ( [15] and independently published in [23] ). The idea is that one can view two rounds of an AES-like permutation as the parallel application of a layer of big Sboxes, named Super-Sboxes, preceded and followed by simple affine transformations. This technique can control 3-rounds in the middle of the differential trail with only a few operations on average, but works especially when the number of active bytes in the controlled rounds is important (this allowed to use longer differential paths which generally contain more active bytes). Because of some local precomputation steps, the drawback of this technique is its memory requirement when the size of the internal state of the scheme is too big. In the case of Grøstl this remains acceptable with a 2 64 memory requirement, but in the case of ECHO as much as 2 512 memory is required, making this tool unsuitable for this hash proposal. We refer to the original article [15] for more details.
3 Improved differential attack for ECHO
Description of ECHO
ECHO is a double-pipe hash function using HAIFA [4] as chaining iteration mode. The message to hash is first padded and divided into fixed-length blocks M i which are used to update iteratively the chaining variable H i (originally initialized with an initial vector H 0 = IV ) thanks to the compression function h: H i = h(H i−1 , M i ). Finally, the hash output is obtained by truncating the last chaining variable. The compression function is built upon a 2048-bit AES-like permutation P R E composed of R rounds and its internal state can be viewed as a 4 × 4 matrix of 128-bit words (or cells). A cell will be denoted by C i,j , where i is its row position and j its column position in the matrix, starting the counting from 0. One round of P R E is composed of three layers: the "BIG SubBytes" layer (big Sbox or B.SB), the "BIG ShiftRows" layer (B.ShR) and the "BIG MixColumns" layer (B.MC).
The BIG SubBytes layer is a non-linear function defined by the application of a big Sbox S on each 128-bit cell and this big Sbox is made of 2 AES rounds. The classical AddRoundKey part from the AES is not present in P R E and in order to avoid trivial symmetric vulnerabilities that would occur, each big Sbox in ECHO is distinct thanks to different subkey additions in each of the 2-round AES uses. The first round subkey depends on the value of a 64-bit internal counter K that is different at each use, while the second round subkey is set to the 128-bit salt value and thus always remains the same during the whole ECHO computation. So, for each cell C i,j of the internal state, we compute
where AES sk denotes the application of one AES round with the subkey sk. As for the AES, the BIG ShiftRows transformation permutes the position of each cell in its own row: for each cell C i,j of the internal state, we compute C i,j = C i,Subi(j) where Sub i (j) = (j −i) mod 4. Finally, the BIG MixColumns function is a linear function that mixes all the columns of the internal state separately. More precisely, the 32-bit AES MixColumns function is reused: if C b i,j denotes the b-th byte of the cell C i,j , then we compute
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ b ≤ 16. The round function on an internal state C can thus be defined as:
In the case of the ECHO-256 compression function, 8 rounds of the permutation are applied and a folding phase is processed after the final feedforward. Namely, the folding phase (denoted fold 256 ) xors all the four 512-bit columns together. Finally, the compression function takes a 1536-bit message input M (12 words) and a 512-bit chaining variable input H (4 words) and outputs a new 512-bit chaining variable H with
In the case of the ECHO-512 compression function, 10 rounds of the permutation are applied in order to turn a 1024-bit message input M (8 words) and a 1024-bit chaining variable input H (8 words) onto a new 1024-bit chaining variable H . A different folding phase is processed after the final feedforward. Namely, the folding phase (denoted fold 512 ) xors the two first and the two last 512-bit columns together.
Since ECHO is a nested design of AES-like permutations, we will always use the prefix "BIG" when referring to one of the three layers of the 2048-bit permutation. When not using a prefix, we will refer to the layers of the 2-round AES permutation in the big Sboxes of ECHO. [3] for the full specifications.
Generic differential paths
In order to fully use the power of recent freedom degrees optimization techniques, the core of the differential path we will mainly use will not differ from the ones described in [15, 26, 27] . The reason here is that this core characteristic is perfectly fit for using the available freedom degrees in the middle: it is computationally very costly in its middle part, but quite cheap on its side parts. This core truncated differential path is 7 rounds long and is depicted in Figure 1 . Of course, when attacking a smaller number of rounds than 7, one can use this core to build a further reduced path by cutting off some of the first and/or last rounds. One could then use the Super-Sbox technique [15, 23] in order to find a pair verifying this differential path. More precisely, one can find a pair of internal states verifying the 128-bit truncated differential trail from the beginning of round 2 (B.SB are chosen (no more truncated differentials). Therefore, for ECHO we consider that the controlled rounds go from B.SB One can easily check that the rest of the path (the uncontrolled rounds) is fulfilled with probability one, except round 1. Indeed, in round 1, a 4 ⇒ 1 truncated differential transition is expected through the backward computation of the BIG MixColumns layer B.MC 1 . When dealing with 128-bit truncated differentials, this will happen with approximate probability 2 −24×16 = 2 −384 (i.e. a 4 ⇒ 1 byte-wise truncated differential transition is expected through sixteen parallel AESM ixColumns functions). Since one can generate 2 512 valid candidates for the controlled rounds with 2 512 computations and memory, the overall complexity is 2 512 for finding at least one valid pair for the core path from Figure 1 . We will see that by looking at byte-wise truncated differentials (instead of word-wise), one can sharpen the differential path and derive an improved Super-Sbox attack for ECHO that requires less memory and minimal number of computations. Also, this allows to improve the success probability of this uncontrolled BIG MixColumns layer. On the other side, in order to be able to use the byte-wise truncated differentials at this stage and since he can control the difference only in B.SB 
Differential transitions for 2 AES rounds
Now that we introduced the core of the differential path, we need to study the word-wise differential transitions. That is, instead of looking for 128-bit truncated differentials, we will look at byte-wise truncated differentials. Of course, we still fully leverage the previous works on Super-Sbox attacks: the attacker can find a valid candidate pair verifying the controlled rounds and fully control the differences in B.SB with one operation on average. Sharpening the differential path will improve the results since our scope is now wider, but it will also greatly increase the number of potential trails and complicate the analysis. For that reason, we need to heuristically filter them so that we place our search into a good subspace. First, we restrict ourselves to four types of byte-wise truncated differential words F, C, D and 1, all depicted in Figure 2 . Secondly, we add the constraint that all the active 128-bit words in an internal state will present the same byte-wise truncated differential (all words have the same truncated differential types F, C, D or 1). This seems a sound constraint as the processing of the BIG MixColumns layer on one word column of the internal state can be seen as the parallel application of sixteen AESM ixColumns functions (one for each byte position). Thus, for each word column, instead of analyzing the behavior of sixteen parallel AESM ixColumns functions one conceptually only handles a single function that will do for all the 16. Those two filters will really simplify the analysis. Since the attacker will have to control the behavior of BIG SubBytes layer B.SB 2 , we have to study the success probability for each possible transition for 2 AES rounds between the four bit-wise truncated differentials F, C, D and 1, especially in backward direction. First, we can compute the approximate probability of success for a one-round transition between those four 128-bit differential states and this is given in Table 2 for both forward and backward directions. Those probabilities are simply obtained by studying the AESM ixColumns transitions for one AES round (since we are dealing with byte-wise truncated differentials, all the probabilities comes only from the AESM ixColumns transitions, see [35] ).
When computing backward through B.SB 2 , the AESM ixColumns function from the second AES round is the first function to invert. But since this layer is fully linear, one can verify the expected backward transitions by carefully choosing the differences in B.SB out 2 beforehand. Since the Super-Sbox attack allows us such a liberty, the second AES round in B.SB 2 comes for free (one only has to check that the transition is not impossible, i.e. the probability in Table 2 is not null). Finally, having set all the constraints and the cost evaluation, we only have to pick the best backward differential transition through B.SB 2 in terms of probability and active byte weight: D ⇐ 1 ⇐ C. The transition D ⇐ 1 is free as showed by Table 2 , while the 2 −24 probability for the transition 1 ⇐ C is not taken in account since we can avoid it by carefully choosing the byte-wise truncated differences in B.SB happening with probability 2 −24 . Thus, for the whole BIG MixColumns layer, we get a probability of 2 −24×4 = 2 −96 and this has to be compared to the previous 2 −24×16 = 2 −384 probability. The whole 7-round differential path is depicted in Figure 3 and a valid candidate can be found with complexity 2 96 operations. However, the Super-Sbox technique still forces us to a minimal complexity of 2 512 computations and memory. We describe here an improved method that can find a valid candidate for the controlled rounds with minimal cost of 2 32 computations and memory and with a average cost per solution of 2 32 . We start by fixing a random column difference for the only active word at the output of B.MC 4 (the very right side of the controlled rounds). One can directly obtain the difference on the output of B.SB 4 by inverting the linear process from the output of B.MC 4 . Note that when choosing a random column value at the output of B.MC 4 , we do so that when inverting all the linear operations (B.MC 4 and the last MixColumns and ShiftRow layer of B.SB 4 ) we eventually come to a single active byte in all the four active words (or a single active column in all the four active words) on the output of the second SubBytes layer of B.SB 4 . Identically, by fixing random column differences for the four active words at the input of B.MC 2 (the very left side of the controlled rounds), one directly obtains the difference on the input of B.SB 3 . Note that as explained previously, this random difference must be chosen so that it fulfills as well the differential transitions 1 ⇐ C through the backward computation of the first AES round of B.SB 2 . At this point all we have to do is to find a pair of internal state mapping the B.SB 3 input difference to the B.SB 4 output difference. It is easy to check that one can take care of the four 512-bit columns of ECHO independently. Said in other words, we have to handle four independent Super-Sboxes of size 512 bits each. We represent in Figure 4 the situation for a single 512-bit Super-Sbox.
We first do some precomputation work: for the 512-bit column considered, the B.SB 3 layer can be viewed as the parallel application of sixteen 32-bit Super-Sboxes. We already fixed the input differences of those Super-Sboxes and for each one we compute the output difference according to each of the 2 possible input values. The output differences are sorted and stored in tables and this step costs us about 2 32 computations and memory. Later, these tables will allow us to directly find for each Super-Sbox a valid 32-bit candidate value given an output difference.
One can see that in B.SB 4 only a single 32-bit Super-Sbox is active. Moreover, we already fixed the output difference δ of this Super-Sbox. Thus, for each possible 32-bit value v on its output, we compute backward and immediately obtain the corresponding value v and difference δ on the input. From δ we can invert B.MC 3 , obtain the output difference on B.SB 3 and we look in the precomputed tables the values mapping to this difference through the sixteen parallel Super-Sboxes of B.SB 3 . At this point, it is possible that no candidate exists for each Super-Sbox. However, as described in [15] , when a solution is found for each Super-Sbox, we immediately derive several ones by switching the ordering of the pairs. Overall, we can hope for one solution on average.
Once a solution is found for B.SB 3 , all differences and values are fixed. However, there is a probability of 2 −32 that we retrieve the value v after the forward application of B.MC 3 . Thus, by testing all the 2
32 possible values v, we have a good chance to fulfill this condition and therefore a final solution for the controlled rounds.
Overall, with a minimal cost of 2 32 computations and memory, one can find a solution for the controlled rounds with 2 32 computations on average. A valid pair of internal states for the entire differential path from Figure 3 can be obtained with 2 128 computations and 2 32 memory.
Since the internal permutation of ECHO is much bigger than its hash output size, it should be easy to distinguish it from a random 2048-bit permutation. Note that our solution pair has four active 128-bit words in the input and four active 128-bit words in the output (the last BIG MixColumns call is not taken in account since it is fully linear). A naive analysis would conclude that for a random 2048-bit permutation, finding such a pair with a birthday paradox technique should require at least 2 (2048−512)/2 = 2 768 operations. However, since the input and output amount of differences is low, the attacker can not fully leverage the power of the birthday paradox. We conclude by reusing the concept of limited birthday distinguishers [15] that for a random 2048-bit permutation, finding such a pair should require at least 2 1024 operations. 2 Finally, 7 rounds of the internal permutation of ECHO can be distinguished from a random 2048-bit permutation with 2 128 operations and 2 32 memory. The amount of freedom degrees available during the attack is discussed in the Appendix A and a costly distinguisher for 8 rounds of the ECHO internal permutation is given in Appendix B.
Internal differential attack: application to Grøstl

Description of Grøstl
We give in this section the description of Grøstl and refer to the submission document [14] for more details. Grøstl is a double-pipe hash function that uses a chaining mode similar to the MerkleDamgård [11, 29] iteration. More precisely, after having initialized the internal state H 0 and padded the input message string, the iteration i updates the 2n-bit chaining variable H i with the 2n-bit incoming message block M i by applying the compression function h: H i = h(H i−1 , M i ). After having processed all the t message blocks, an output function is applied to the last chaining variable to obtain the n-bit hash result: hash = trunc n (P (H t ) ⊕ H t ), where trunc n is the truncation function of the n first bits and P is an AES-based permutation. The double-pipe compression function h is built upon two similar parallel AES-based permutations P and Q (that only differ by the constants addition layers) to update chaining variable H with message block M :
In the case of Grøstl-256, the 512-bit internal state of both permutations can be viewed as a 8 × 8 matrix of bytes. A byte for permutation P is denoted by CP i,j (resp. CQ i,j for permutation Q), where i is its row position and j its column position in the matrix, starting the counting from 0. P and Q are both 10-round long and each round is composed of 4 layers. The first layer (AddConstant or AC) is a constant addition function. More precisely, for the round number i (starting the counting from 0), in P the byte CP 0,0 is xored with i and in Q the byte CQ 7,0 is xored with i ⊕ 0xff. Note that this layer is the only difference between permutations P and Q. The second layer (SubBytes or SB) is a nonlinear function defined by the application of the AES Sbox S to each byte. The third layer (ShiftRows or ShR) cyclically rotates to the left the position of each byte in its own row with the following constants: (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Finally, the last layer (MixColumns or MC) is a linear function that mixes all the columns of the internal state separately. As for AESM ixColumns, the matrix multiplication underlying this transformation is a Maximum-Distance Separable mapping. In order to avoid overweighting the notations, we used the same notations for the ECHO and Grøstl subfunctions, but their meaning is implicit depending on which scheme we are dealing with. The round function on an internal state C can thus be defined as: In the case of Grøstl-512, the 1024-bit internal state of both permutations can be viewed as a 8 × 16 matrix of bytes. P and Q are both 14-round long and each round is composed of the 4 layers. The round function is identical to the Grøstl-256 case, except the rotation constants in the third layer: (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11).
The internal differential attack
In this section, we will show that very good differential trails can be found for Grøstl. Our new technique, the internal differential attack , may apply when a function is built upon parallel computation branches that are not distinct enough. The trick is to devise a differential path representing the differences between the branches and not between two inputs of the function. Usually this is avoided by a forcing strong separation between the two parallel branches. For example, for all steps of the hash functions RIPEMD [39] or RIPEMD-160 [12] , very distinct constants are used in the left and right branches. However, in the case of Grøstl, this separation is thin between permutations P and Q, and we will describe in the next sections how to exploit this property in order to mount for example a distinguishing attack against the full Grøstl-256 compression function.
All the previous analysis of Grøstl studied the differential behavior of the permutations in a classic way. That is, they derived differential trails by dealing with two different inputs for each of the permutations P and Q (the two permutations were attacked separately). Those permutations mimicking the AES block cipher, the best usable differential paths naturally reached 8 rounds [15] , but we argue that much more interesting trails can be built. We do not analyze the two permutations separately, but we build a differential path between them: we keep track of the differences ongoing between branch P and branch Q (see Figure 5 ). We compute two internal states A and B, such that A ⊕ B = ∆ IN and such that P (A) ⊕ Q(B) = ∆ OU T . This idea comes naturally after having noticed that permutations P and Q are really similar, since their only distinction is the constant addition phase. Even in that step, the distinction is really thin: a different constant is added on only two different bytes. Thus, we can hope that the amount of differences will remain low when setting a differential trail.
Since using truncated differentials is very handy when attacking AES-like permutations, we will only keep track of active and inactive bytes through the path. Also, preparing for the utilization of SuperSbox attacks, we aim for a differential path in which the costly part lies in the middle, and the cheap parts on the sides. In Figure 16 and 17 from the Appendix D, we provide a differential path between the permutations P and Q of the Grøstl-256 compression function for the 9-round and the 10-round versions respectively. In Figure 18 from the Appendix D, we depict a differential path between the permutations P and Q of the Grøstl-512 compression function reduced to 11 rounds. Note that only one difference is incorporated during AC 0 since the constant added in P is 0.
Deriving a distinguisher for the Grøstl compression function or internal permutations
In the following, our goal is to distinguish the Grøstl compression function from an ideal primitive on the same domain. As shown in Figure 5 , once the differential path settled, we find a valid pair of internal states (A, B) such that
where ∆ IN and ∆ OU T are respectively the input and output truncated differences. We then set H = A ⊕ B and M = B and we obtain
We will show that ∆ IN and ∆ OU T are always maintained in a small subspace of x and y elements respectively. As a consequence, ∆ IN ⊕ ∆ OU T will also belong to a small subspace of the full output domain. Said in other words, we will be able to compute outputs of the 2n-bit compression function that always belong to a predetermined set of at most k = x · y elements. In the ideal case, one such input/output property should not be obtained with substantially less than 2 2n /k compression function calls. Unlike the previously known distinguishers that find partially colliding outputs for AES-like permutations, the one we describe here is more "preimage" oriented.
One can go further and even try to distinguish the Grøstl compression function from its internal construction
assuming P and Q as ideal permutations. We will compute pairs (H, M ) such that H belong to a small subspace of x elements and H to a small subspace of k = x · y elements. In the ideal case, one may think that the best attack can obtain such a property this with min{ 2 2n /x, 2 2n /y} computations by performing a birthday method with the two branches. However, this is not the case here because a strong constraint exists on the amount of differences between the two branches on the input and the output (see the limited birthday distinguishers [15] ) and the best known complexity to obtain the input/output property with ideal permutations P and Q is 2 2n /(k · x) computations. It is important to remark that this type of distinguisher is new since the already known ones are structural, i.e. they already consider P and Q as ideal permutations.
Even simpler, one can distinguish the construction f (a, b) = P (a) ⊕ Q(b) when P and Q are ideal permutations or the Grøstl internal permutations. The value of a⊕b is maintained in a subspace of x elements and the output is maintained in a subspace of y elements. The limited birthday distinguisher [15] implies that 2 2n /k computations are required to find such a candidate in the ideal permutations case. This will show that permutations P and Q are not ideal.
While formally defining a distinguisher for a keyless primitive is difficult [40] , we argue that the property we exhibit here works for any choice of Sbox, MixColumns function or AddConstant positions for example. Note that such keyless primitive distinguishers have already been utilized in [15, 26] .
Let Grøstl(a) denote the Grøstl hash function for which the constant addition in Q is i ⊕ a instead of i ⊕ 0xff. Clearly, when choosing a > 0x1a, we ensure that the constant values added in P and Q are always distinct and each member of this family of Grøstl hash functions should have the same security as Grøstl(0xff). Overall, for each member of the family, the attacker can exhibit with good probability an output maintained in the set of k elements, while the input H belongs to the subspace of x elements. Thus, if we are queried to distinguish the Grøstl compression function instantiated with permutations corresponding to Grøstl(a) from the same construction with random permutations P and Q, we have a very good probability to succeed. It shows a weakness in the Grøstl design philosophy.
Finding a collision for the hash function
One can use the internal differential attack in order to find a collision for the reduced Grøstl hash function. Note that this is usually much harder than finding a collision for the compression function only. We provide in Figure 6 a differential path for 5 rounds of Grøstl-256. Note that the very first state is fully active and can be forced to any random difference value since located in the controlled rounds. The idea of the attack is the following: by choosing a random message prefix P re, we obtain a random chaining variable value that we denote R and we have ∆ IN = R. Then, we find two valid message block candidates M 1 and M 2 for the differential path starting from R. We denote by ∆ 1 OU T and ∆ 2 OU T their respective output differences. We have
) and (P re||M 1 , P re||M 2 ) is a colliding message pair for the hash function. Note that in this scenario, we have largely enough freedom degree in order to find the collision since we can choose a large set of message prefix.
Results
In this section we present our results on the compression functions of ECHO and Grøstl. For completeness, we give in the Appendix C the analysis for the single-pipe version ECHO-SP. Moreover, we also provide in the Appendix A a study of the amount of freedom degrees available during the attacks.
Distinguishers for the ECHO compression function
ECHO-256. We use the 4-round differential path from Figure 7 which is derived from the 7-round core path. The uncontrolled part requires 2 64 candidates (through the backward computation of B.MC 0 ), while the improved Super-Sbox method for ECHO generates one valid candidate for the controlled part with 2 32 computations and 2 32 memory. Overall, we obtain a valid pair for the whole differential path with 2 96 computations and 2 32 memory (2 32 such pairs can be generated by the attacker and 2 160 if the salt is controlled as well). ECHO-512. We use the 6-round differential path from Figure 8 also derived from the 7-round core path. In both cases, we obtain compression function outputs colliding on 2 predetermined words (i.e. 256 bits) and this should require 2 128 computations in the ideal case. Note that since all active 128-bit words in the end of the differential path are fully active, we could have added another B.SB layer and attacked one more half-round.
Collisions for the ECHO compression function
ECHO-256. We use a special 3-round differential path depicted in Figure 9 . In this trail, the improved Super-Sbox technique for ECHO can be applied exactly as previously explained for the 7-round core path. Thus, a valid candidate for the controlled rounds can be found with 2 32 computations and 2 32 memory, while the uncontrolled part is verified with probability 1. Note that the column differences after B.MC 2 can be chosen beforehand so that they xor to zero during the folding phase. Using the freedom degrees counting method, one can check that only 2 32 valid pair can be obtained with this extra condition. However, in order to get a collision on the output, we have to make the diagonal differences on the input collide during the folding phase. Since we have 32 bit positions concerned, the attacker has to go through those 2 32 candidates and finally the attack complexity is 2 64 computations and 2 32 memory in order to find a free-start collision attack for the ECHO-256 compression function. Similarly, a chosen-salt semi-free-start collision attack could be obtained by using the differential path from Figure 10 . The situation is exactly the same as previously, except that one has 64 bit positions to collide on and the salt will have to be randomized on 2 32 values in order to provide enough freedom degrees. Thus, finding a chosen-salt semi-free-start collision attack for the ECHO-256 compression function requires 2 96 computations and 2 32 memory. ECHO-512. We use the 3-round differential path depicted in Figure 11 . The situation is exactly the same as for the path from Figure 10 . Therefore, one can derive a chosen-salt semi-free-start collision attack for the ECHO-512 compression function with 2 96 computations and 2 32 memory. We denote by V an AES word with one column and one diagonal active.
Distinguishers for the Grøstl compression function
Grøstl-256. We use the Super-Sbox technique to find two 512-bit internal states such that the 9-round differential path from Figure 16 between permutations P and Q is verified. Namely, one can find internal state values for P and Q verifying the truncated differential trail from the output of SB 2 up to the input of SB 5 with one computation on average. However, the 8 → 2 MixColumns transition through MC 5 during the uncontrolled rounds is verified with probability 2 −48 . Also, 2 byte differences must be erased during both AddConstant functions AC 2 and AC 6 which adds another 2 −4×8 = 2 −32 factor. Overall, one can find a valid candidate for the whole path with only 2 48+32 = 2 80 computations (an amount of 2 64 memory is required by the Super-Sbox technique).
Regarding the 10-round differential path from Figure 17 , the controlled rounds go from the output of SB 3 up to the input of SB 6 . Then, the two 8 → 1 MixColumns transitions through MC 2 and the 8 → 2 transition through MC 6 during the uncontrolled rounds happen with probability 2 −2×56 = 2 −112 and 2 −48 respectively. Also, 2 byte differences must be erased during both AddConstant functions AC 2 and AC 7 which adds another 2 −4×8 = 2 −32 factor. Overall, one can find a valid candidate for the whole path with only 2 112+48+32 = 2 192 computations (again, an amount of 2 64 memory is required by the utilization of the Super-Sbox technique).
The freedom degrees analysis from Appendix A shows that for both paths from Figure 16 and 17, one can expect to obtain one solution with good probability. Indeed, for both paths, when the success probability for a random input pair to verify the trail is 2 −z , we have about 2 z freedom degrees available. We argue in the Appendix that it is sufficient for the attack to be considered as valid and we give in Section 5.5 a method that provides some additional freedom degrees.
Grøstl-512. As for Grøstl-256, we use the Super-Sbox technique to find two 1024-bit internal states such that the 11-round differential path from Figure 18 between permutations P and Q is verified. Namely, one can find internal state values for P and Q from the output of SB 3 up to the input of SB 6 with one computation on average. However, the MixColumns transition through MC 6 during the uncontrolled rounds happens with probability 2 −(48+7×56) = 2 −440 : the first column is a 8 → 2 transition, while the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and twelfth are 8 → 1 transitions. The next MixColumns layer MC 7 contains a 8 → 2 transition, adding another factor 2 −48 . Regarding MC 2 , the first and sixth columns are 8 → 1 transitions, thus successfully verified with a total probability of 2 −2×56 = 2 −112 .
Also, 2, 1 and 2 byte differences must be erased during AddConstant functions AC 2 , AC 7 and AC 8 respectively. This adds another 2 −5×8 = 2 −40 factor. Overall, one can find a valid candidate for the whole path with 2 440+48+112+40 = 2 640 computations (an amount of 2 64 memory is required by the Super-Sbox technique for Grøstl). Again, the freedom degrees analysis shows that we can expect one solution with good probability.
The distinguisher for Grøstl compression function and internal permutations. In order to mount the distinguisher for Grøstl, one has to analyze the amount k of reachable output difference values. The situation is completely identical for the paths from Figures 16 and 17 in the Appendix, but we will use the notations from the second one. We have 16 active bytes just before applying the very last MixColumns layer MC 9 . Since the MixColumns layer is fully linear, the amounts of reachable difference values on its input and on its output are equal. Thus, we can deduce that at most y = 2 16×8 = 2 128 distinct output differences can be reached on the output of the differential trail. Regarding the input of the path, the same reasoning gives us that at most x = 2 8×8 = 2 64 distinct input differences can be reached. Note that the difference inserted during AC 0 can be ignored since it is the last layer when computing backward (the difference value on that byte will always be equal to the constant added, i.e. 0xff). Also, it is easy to verify that the differences on the output of SB 0 are always the same (since MixColumns is linear). Thus, since the inverse of the AES Sbox has the property that only 2 7 distinct output differences can be reached when the input difference is fixed, we can conclude that ∆ IN can go through a maximum of x = 2 8×7 = 2 56 distinct values. To summarize, the output chaining variable 64 memory), we finally conclude that our attack can distinguish 9-round reduced or the full 10-round compression function of Grøstl-256 from a random 512-bit compression function. One can even distinguish h from the compression function construction with P and Q assumed ideal since the best known attack requires 2 512−184−56 = 2 272 computations. Moreover, the ideal case complexity to find such a candidate for the f (a, b) = P (a) ⊕ Q(b) construction is 2 512−184 = 2 328 operations and this shows that permutations P and Q can not be considered ideal functions.
In the case of Grøstl-512 (see Figure 18 in the Appendix D), the same reasoning tells us that ∆ IN can go through a maximum of x = 2 56 values and ∆ OU T through a maximum of y = 2 128 values. Thus, the output chaining variable H = h(H, M ) = ∆ IN ⊕ ∆ OU T is limited to a set of at most k = 2 128+56 = 2 184 values, with H being limited to a set of at most x = 2 56 values. For an ideal 1024-bit compression function, reaching any element of this set should require 2 1024−184 = 2 840 operations. We conclude that our 2 640 computations (and 2 64 memory) attack can distinguish a 11-round reduced version of the Grøstl-512 compression function from a random 1024-bit compression function. Again, one can even distinguish h from the compression function construction with P and Q assumed ideal since the best known attack requires 2 1024−184−56 = 2 784 computations. Also, the ideal case complexity to find such a candidate for the f (a, b) = P (a) ⊕ Q(b) construction is 2 1024−184 = 2 840 operations.
Note that structural distinguishers (i.e. working for randomly chosen permutations P and Q) already exist for Grøstl. For example, just like in the Davies-Meyer construction, one can very easily find fixed points for the compression function. Yet, as explained in Section 4.3, we believe that our distinguishers are very interesting because they exploit the real differential properties of the internal permutations P and Q, which is essential in order to appropriately evaluate the security margin in terms of number of rounds. Moreover, such structural attacks can not distinguish h from the compression function construction with P and Q assumed ideal. Finally, we showed that full permutations P and Q for the 256-bit case can not be considered as ideal permutations.
Collisions for the Grøstl hash function
Grøstl-256. We use the differential path from Figure 6 . One can check that the output difference comes from the AC 5 layer that adds two fixed byte differences. On the output of the next SubBytes layer, this leads to 2 14 distinct reachable difference values (this amount is not modified after the application of the last linear MC layer). Thus, with two valid candidates M 1 and M 2 , we have a probability 2 −14 that they will match on their output difference. Now, we have to compute the complexity for finding one single candidate for the trail. The classical application of the Super-Sbox technique gives us an average cost of one operation per solution for the controlled rounds, with a minimal cost of 2 64 computations and memory. The uncontrolled rounds are verified with probability 2 −64 (2 −48 for MC 3 and 2 −16 for AC 4 ). Thus a colliding pair of messages for the Grøstl-256 hash function reduced to 5 rounds can be found with 2 64+14+1 = 2 79 computations and 2 64 memory.
Grøstl-512. We use the 6-round differential path from Figure 19 in the Appendix D. One can check that the output difference comes from the AC 5 and AC 6 layers that adds fixed byte differences. After the application of AC 6 , we have 16 active bytes, which leads to 2 16 * 7 = 2 112 distinct reachable difference values after the next SubBytes layer (this amount is not modified after the application of the last linear MC layer). Thus, with two valid candidates M 1 and M 2 , we have a probability 2 −112 that they will match on their output difference. Now, we have to compute the complexity for finding one single candidate for the trail. The classical application of the Super-Sbox technique gives us an average cost of one operation per solution for the controlled rounds, with a minimal cost of 2 64 computations and memory. The uncontrolled rounds are verified with probability 2 −64 (2 −48 for MC 3 and 2 −16 for AC 4 ). Thus a colliding pair of messages for the Grøstl-512 hash function reduced to 6 rounds can be found with 2 64+112+1 = 2 177 computations and 2 64 memory.
Generalizing the internal differential attack
One can further generalize the internal differential attack in order to obtain more freedom degrees. We previously looked at the differences between permutations P and Q at the very same byte positions, i.e. we looked a the difference between CP i,j and CQ i,j . However, an observation on AES-like permutation symmetries allows us to do else: if one only considers functions SB, ShR and MC, an input composed of columns with the same value will always maintain this property though the round process. In general, this symmetry issue is avoided with the key addition, or the AC layer in Grøstl. In the internal differential attack, this layer is already directly composing our differential path, so we can leverage this property. More precisely, we will now look at the differences between CP i,j and CQ i,(j+r) mod c , where c is the number of columns of the AES-like state (8 for Grøstl-256 and 16 for Grøstl-512) and 0 ≤ r < c is a fixed parameter. Said in other words, we look at the difference between P and a column-rotated variant of Q. One can easily check that this is not going to change anything to our differential paths in regards to SB, ShR and MC because of this column symmetry consideration. However, during the AC layer, the column position of the constant additions in Q will "virtually" change. For example, in the case of Grøstl-256, if r = 1 the only effect on the differential path between P and Q will be that the addition of the constant in Q will move to the last column in each round.
Therefore, one can see that we will deal with 8 or 16 distinct differential paths DP r , discriminated only by the parameter r that changes the virtual column position of the constant addition in Q. For example, in the previous sections or in Figure 16 and 17 from the Appendix D, we used only DP 0 since we had r = 0.
We explained in Section 5.3 that a valid candidate for the 10-round variant of the differential path DP 0 for Grøstl-256 can be found with 2 192 computations and 2 64 memory (or 2 80 computations and 2 64 memory for the 9-round variant), and this will also be the case of DP 1 . However, the six other DP r have one additional active column in the uncontrolled rounds, and an additional 2 64 complexity factor is required. Moreover, the input/output subspaces are also different depending on the value of r and this is summarized in Table 3 , together with the Grøstl-512 case.
Note that each differential path DP r will have the same probability that a solution can be found. This offers a chance to the attacker to perform the attack again in case a solution could not be found for Table 3 . Extending the internal differential attack for Grøstl. Depending on the differential path considered, and the class DP r considered, we provide the complexity required in order to find a valid candidate, as well as the input/output subspaces sizes in which the candidate is contained. The last column shows the complexity to find such a candidate for the f (a, b) = P (a) ⊕ Q(b) construction in the ideal case (2 2n /k). a DP r . However, this will only help in the case we are trying to distinguish the permutations P and Q from ideal permutations. Indeed, in the situation of a compression function distinguisher, the subspace properties we will observe on the output when k = 0 are too restricted.
Conclusion
In this article, based on recent advances on AES-like permutations studies, we provided a new cryptanalysis of ECHO and Grøstl, two second-round SHA-3 candidates. In particular, in the case of Grøstl, we introduce a new cryptanalysis technique: the internal differential attack. Overall, we obtain the best cryptanalysis results known so far for both ECHO and Grøstl. We are able to derive a distinguisher for the full (10 rounds) 256-bit version of the Grøstl compression function or internal permutations. This work also shows that designers must be careful when building a function with parallel branches computations as the internal differential paths may lead to unexpected attacks.
A The amount of freedom degrees
Once a differential path settled, a point has to be clarified: the amount of freedom degrees available to the attacker. Indeed, one has to evaluate how much valid pairs can be found for the whole differential trail. We want to ensure that enough solutions for the controlled rounds exist so that we have a good probability that at least one of them will fulfill the entire differential characteristic. Moreover, when searching for semi-free-start collisions, we may even go further since we may require an important amount of valid candidates for the entire differential path.
Freedom degrees for ECHO
We use the same counting reasoning than in [15] , except that we have to precisely evaluate what is the freedom degrees consumption for the various 2 AES-round differential transitions as well (in [15] it was implicitly assumed that all the BIG SubBytes transitions were F → F, thus happening with probability very close to 1 and consuming no freedom degrees). For example, let us take the D → 1 transition through the BIG SubBytes in the forward direction: we require one AES MixColumns transition 4 → 1 which happens with probability 2 −24 . Thus, if we have k valid candidates on the input, we obtain k ×2 −24 valid candidates on the output of this layer and we consumed 2 24 freedom degrees. The amount of freedom degrees consumed during a transition is the invert of the probability of success of this transition. Thus, with Table 2 , it is very easy to compute the freedom degrees consumption for all the AES round transitions considered so far.
We illustrate the counting method by applying it to the example of the 7-round path from Figure 3 . First, note that the improved Super-Sbox attack for ECHO will find all the possible internal states such that the controlled rounds are verified. We start from state B.MC in 3 (located between B.ShR 3 and B.MC 3 ). This state is fully filled with column differences which means that we can start with 2 2048+32×16 = 2 2560 distinct pairs. When going forward, the B.MC 3 transition happens with probability 2 −24×16 = 2 −384 and the transition through B.MC 4 happens with probability 2 −24×4 = 2 −96 . All the other layers are verified with probability one so the forward computation consumes 2 384+96 = 2 480 freedom degrees. Then, during the backward computation, the sixteen C ← F ← D transitions through B.SB 3 happen with probability 2 −16×96 = 2 −1536 according to Table 2 (C ← F with probability 2 −96 and F ← D with probability 1). Also, the four D ← 1 ← C transitions through B.SB 2 happen with probability 2 −4×24 = 2 −96 (D ← 1 with probability 1 and 1 ← C with probability 2 −24 ). Then, the BIG MixColumns transitions through B.MC 2 are verified with probability 2 −4×4×24 = 2 −384 and through B.MC 1 with probability 2 −4×24 = 2 −96 . All the other layers in the backward direction are verified with probability one. Overall, the backward computation consumes 2 1536+384+96+96 = 2 2112 freedom degrees. We can finally conclude that we started with 2 2560 pairs from which only a factor 2 −480−2112 = 2 −2592 will be valid for the whole differential path. Thus, used as is, one has to use the 128-bit salt input in order to generate 2 96 distinct valid pairs for the 7-round path from Figure 3 .
Finally, some additional freedom degrees can be obtained if one considers that the salt value can be fully controlled by the attacker. While this scenario is not very relevant in practice, it is interesting to see what the attacker is able to do in such a situation. In the case of ECHO, the salt value is 128-bit long and it then directly adds 2 128 supplementary freedom degrees. To conclude, if he controls the salt, the attacker can generate 2 96 distinct valid pairs for the 7-round path depicted in Figure 3 . The same method is used for all the differential trails for ECHO considered in this article.
Note that the differential paths we use are just instances among a family of good differential trails. For example, in the case of the 7-round path from Figure 3 (between B.MC 4 and B.SB 5 ). As a consequence, the attacker manages 16 2 = 2 8 different core paths which provides him 2 8 additional freedom degrees.
Freedom degrees for Grøstl
The case of Grøstl is easier to analyze since we don't have to handle word-wise and byte-wise truncated differentials at the same time. Yet, the same counting technique can be applied. Interestingly, for all the paths we provided concerning Grøstl, an attacker can expect only one solution for the whole trail with good probability. This explains why one can not really hope for a semi-free-start collision attack on reduced versions of Grøstl (such as 7 or 8-round versions) with the paths given. Or, said in other words, a semi-free-start collision attack may be mounted, but will only work with a low probability.
As an example, we provide here the freedom degrees analysis for the 10-round differential path from Figure 17 . By starting from the fully active internal state located at the output of MC 4 , we begin with about 2 512×2 = 2 1024 distinct pairs of internal state values. When going forward, the first freedom degrees consuming operation is the MC 5 transition which happens with probability 2 −7×56−48 = 2 −440 . Then, one byte is erased during AC 6 while the transition through MC 6 happens with probability 2 −48 and in total this round consumes 2 8+48 = 2 56 freedom degrees. Finally, the last consuming operation when computing forward is AC 7 for which two bytes have to be erased (2 16 ). When computing backward, the MixColumns functions MC 3 and MC 2 requires 2 48×8 = 2 384 and 2 2×56 = 2 112 freedom degrees respectively. Then, two bytes are erased through AC 2 and all the other differential transitions consume nothing since they are deterministic. Finally, we started with 2 1024 freedom degrees from which only a fraction 2 −440−8−48−16−384−112−16 = 2 −1024 will verify the whole differential path. Thus, since this reasoning is done on average, an attacker has a good probability to obtain one single solution for the whole differential path.
Of course, one may argue that the attacker should have one more freedom degree to perform the attack. Yet, note that until really performed, most hash function attacks only have a certain success probability to actually find a solution. For example, in the case of SHA-1, even if very low, there is a probability that the known collision attacks eventually provide no solution. Therefore, with only a single freedom degree missing, we believe that the success probability is far sufficiently high in order to consider the attack as valid. Finally, additional freedom degrees can be found by using a generalization of the internal differential attack, as explained in Section 5.5.
B Distinguishing the full internal permutation of ECHO-256
A 8-round core truncated differential path is given in Figure 12 . Its usability is limited only to distinguish 8 rounds of the internal ECHO permutation (the full number of rounds for ECHO-256) and not a smaller number of rounds by cutting the beginning and/or the end of the trail. Indeed, the improved Super-Sbox attack for ECHO can not be used anymore as too many active cells are present in the middle rounds. One has to use the classical Super-Sbox method instead, which is inefficient in the case of ECHO since it requires at least 2 512 computations and memory. From this core trail we derive the truncated differential path from Figure 13 for which one can obtain a valid candidate with a complexity of 2 512 computations and memory. Indeed, the uncontrolled rounds are verified with probability 2 −480 (because of the sixteen AES MixColumns transitions 4 → 1 through B.MC 5 and the four AES MixColumns transitions 4 → 1 through B.MC 1 ), but the Super-Sbox forces a minimal cost of 2 512 . Concerning the freedom degrees, the counting method from Appendix A shows that the attacker can generate a total of 2 64 valid candidates for the whole differential path (and 2
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when the salt is controlled as well).
The solution pair has four active 128-bit words in the input and four active 128-bit words in the output (the last BIG MixColumns call is not taken in account since it is fully linear). The situation is exactly the same as for the 7-round distinguisher using path from Figure 3 : by reusing the concept of limited birthday distinguishers [15] we deduce that for a random 2048-bit permutation, finding such a pair should require at least 2 1024 operations.
The 8-round path from Figure 14 (also derived from the full core path from Figure 12 ) seems to be slightly better since the uncontrolled rounds are verified with probability 2 B.MC 5 and the four AES MixColumns transitions 4 → 1 through B.MC 1 ). However, the amount of freedom degrees is greatly reduced as the attacker has a very small probability 2 −128 to actually find a single valid candidate for the whole differential path. Thus, this path is acceptable only if the salt can be controlled, which would lead to a single valid pair for the whole differential trail. The results concerning the internal permutation of ECHO are summarized in Table 4 . Note that none of those distinguishers apply to the ECHO compression function due to the extra protection provided by the final shrinking stage of the compression function -namely its convolution effect on the output distribution of the permutation. distinguisher this paper
C The ECHO-SP case
In the latest versions of the submission document [3] , the authors propose a variant of ECHO, named ECHO-SP (for simple pipe). The specifications are exactly the same, but the final phase at the end of each compression function call outputs a n-bit chaining variable for a n-bit final hash value. Namely, the compression function of ECHO-SP-256 is identical to the one from ECHO-256 except that the two first words are xored with the two last words of the output column in order to obtain a 256-bit output chaining variable.
The compression function of ECHO-SP-512 is also identical to the one from ECHO-512 except that the first words column is xored with the second words column in order to obtain a 512-bit output chaining variable. Said in other words, ECHO-SP-512 and ECHO-256 compression functions are identical and the results obtained on the latter directly apply to the former. Concerning ECHO-SP-256, we use the differential path from Figure 15 which is almost identical to the one from Figure 9 . The analysis is also identical and we obtain semi-free-start collisions with 2 64 computations and 2 32 memory. Note that one can not use the distinguishing attack from ECHO-256 anymore, because the generic complexity decreases with the output size. Fig. 17. 10-round differential path between P and Q for Grøstl-256. Each cell represents a byte and a gray cell stands for an active byte. The controlled rounds are depicted with dashed lines. The matrices on the left represent the differences incorporated during the AC layers. Fig . 19 . 6-round differential path between P and Q for Grøstl-512. Each cell represents a byte and a gray cell stands for an active byte. The controlled rounds are depicted with dashed lines. The matrices on the left represent the differences incorporated during the AC layers.
